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At the third round of talks in Managua, the contras had informed all concerned parties that they
would present a proposal to the government. However, a typed list of demands contained in
the proposal was finally made available to government negotiators only on May 28, the last day
of the talks. Included in the May 28 proposal were the following demands, to be implemented
by the government within five days of signing a permanent ceasefire agreement: release of all
former National Guardsmen and contras held in Nicaraguan prisons; an end to the military draft;
authorization of private (opposition) television stations; organizing a new constitutional assembly
to rewrite the nation's magna carta; and, power-sharing with the government. The contras also
presented a list of nine "democratization" measures to be implemented by the government.
Government negotiators quickly responded to the proposal, indicating "word for word" acceptance
of six of the nine democratization measures; acceptance of the remaining three with slight
modifications; and, the addition of a tenth in which the government guaranteed the right to private
property. The government announced agreement with the following contra demands: political
pluralism with respect for ethnic, cultural and religious values; separation and independence of
government powers; equality of citizens; freedom of expression, association, assembly, religion and
education; equality of rights and opportunities before the law of all political parties, state institutions
and organs at the service of the national interest; right to strike; due process guarantees; pluralist
and participatory electoral system; and, guarantee for a mixed economy. Next, the government
proposed that once the verification commission established at Sapoa headed by Cardinal Miguel
Obando y Bravo and Organization of American States Secretary General Joao Baena Soares issues
a finding that all contra forces have been relocated to the seven ceasefire zones, the contras could
select eight representatives to participate in the "national dialogue" in Managua to design a
timetable on the implementation of the democratization measures. Paul Reichler, a US attorney
acting as an adviser to the government negotiators, said that the contras "appeared disappointed
and disoriented that the government accepted the proposal." He added that the contras were
suddenly disinterested in further discussion of their own proposal. The fourth round of negotiations
for a permanent ceasefire between high-level delegations of the Nicaraguan government and the
contras took place in Managua on June 7-9. On Thursday afternoon, the talks appeared to break
down, but later both sides announced willingness to meet once again, although dates for the next
round were not established. A summary of developments and statements appears below. Before
the fourth round began, a government statement announced that its negotiators would press for the
"immediate release" of over 1,000 civilians abducted by the contras. The contras claim they have
only 66 "prisoners of war," and that preparations were underway to release them in Guatemala
City. June 7: Government negotiators told reporters in Managua that some progress in the talks
had occurred, but that the contras were holding up an agreement to see if the Republicans win
the presidency in the November elections. Reichler said he found the contras' attitude "a little
contradictory...On one hand, they came here with an ultimatum, saying this was the last chance for
peace. On the other hand, they are still negotiating part of an agreement that would take months
to implement...I believe Bermudez is holding out to see if (Vice President) George Bush wins in
November and the Republicans gain a majority in the House. He knows he won't get any more
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military aid from the current Congress." According to Reichler, two fundamental issues remained to
be resolved before a definitive agreement could be completed: a timetable for contra disarmament
and integration into the political process, and the release of former National Guard members and
contra prisoners by the government. Reichler said, "Our proposal called on them to reintegrate into
society during September, whereas they give themselves until the end of January 1989 after the next
president is inaugurated." The government proposed that half the prisoners would be released once
the contras are concentrated into the seven ceasefire zones, while the remaining half would be set
free at the time the contras disarm. The contras continued to insist on release of all prisoners within
five days of reaching a permanent ceasefire agreement. According to Reichler, other so-called "fiveday demands" in the May 28 contra proposal had apparently been dropped. As reported by UPI
(06/07/88), Reichler's remarks seemed to contradict statements by contra spokesperson Frank Arana,
who told Radio Noticiero in Managua the contras would insist on discussing the five-day proposals
they presented in late May. The government described the five-day proposals as "unrealistic and
provocative," adding that they are in violation of both the March 23 Sapoa accord, and the regional
peace plan signed in August 1987, known as Esquipulas II. The government's proposed timetable
follows: June 16: The Nicaraguan Army withdraws from the seven designated ceasefire zones. July
5: Deadline for all contra forces to be located in ceasefire zones. July 12: Verification Commission
would issue a finding that the contra fighters had in fact relocated, and then begin overseeing
delivery of humanitarian aid supplies to the ceasefire zones via the OAS affiliate, the Pan-American
Development Foundation. Government releases 800 prisoners, including 320 contras, and 480 former
National Guardsmen. (Former Guardsmen to be released are those who did not participate in
major crimes, as determined by the OAS Human Rights Commission.) The Nicaraguan Resistance
sends eight representatives of their political organizations to participate in the "national dialogue"
under the auspices of the National Reconciliation Commission created under the regional peace
plan last year. Participants in the dialogue include the FSLN and domestic political opposition
parties. The principal objectives of the dialogue to continue for two months until Sept. 12 are to
establish timetables and details for the implementation of democratization procedures. Sept. 12:
Disarmament of contras in four of seven ceasefire zones begins. Government releases remainder
of former National Guard and contra prisoners. (OAS Human Rights Commission verification
of former Guardsmen also applies here.) Oct. 10: Disarmament of contras in remaining three
zones (located in Atlantic coastal and Chontales areas) begins. June 8: Reichler told journalists
the following: "It's clear to me that the contras are not gong to sign...They have never been more
rigid, inflexible and intransigent. I've never seem them take such a hard line. It's like all the furies
have burst loose." The Sandinista police briefly detained more than a dozen opposition politicians
who had prepared a letter of protest to present to the National Assembly. The politicians were
detained as they set out to walk half a mile from their opposition headquarters to the Assembly,
and were released soon afterward. Their letter denounced the law under which several radio news
programs have temporarily been shut down. Government spokesperson Manuel Espinoza said no
political marches were permitted without police permission. He said the contras were not sincerely
seeking peace, but rather hoped to portray the government as unwilling to compromise. "They
may be planning to leave here saying that no accord was possible because the Sandinistas were not
serious...Then they would go back to Congress and say they need new military aid. This danger does
exist." June 9: A government proposal presented on Thursday morning called for a gradual release
of Guardsmen and contra prisoners. The first 200 prisoners would be released after a permanent
ceasefire agreement is signed, and the last group on Sept. 28. On Thursday afternoon, it appeared
that the peace talks had collapsed. Chief contra negotiator Alfredo Cesar said negotiations linked
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to the Sapoa accord had ended. However, he also said that the ceasefire in force since the March 23
accord would continue. Chief negotiator for the government, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega
said the contras were to blame for the breakdown in negotiations. The contras, he said, did not wish
to reach an agreement "on anything...In killing the possiblity of peace, they have committed suicide
as a political force." Ortega stated that the fate of the talks rests on whether the contras resume
the war. He then remarked: "If peace is not obtained at the bargaining table, it will be easy on the
battlefield. The days of the contras are numbered, and by their actions at the talks they have only
brought closer the time of their demise." The minister continued by asserting that the contras "have
merely adopted the positions of the most recalcitrant sectors of the Reagan administration." He
added that the contra delegation refused to sign a document extending the ceasefire, and refused
to accept the continued application fo the Sapoa accord, and actions undertaken by the Verification
Commission created under the accord. Next, Ortega described the contras' most recent demands
as "irrational." He referred to contra "five-day" demands for the release of all National Guardsmen
and contra prisoners; election of a new constitutional assembly; reconstitution of the Supreme Court
of Justice, and appointment of a new electoral council. Cesar stated that the government's proposal
did not mention the "necessity" of terminating the influence of the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) over the Army and the police. "Democratization must be fulfilled before we lay down
our arms." According to Cesar, "The resistance is offering to lay down our arms by the month of
August once these democratic reforms are put into effect." In the talks on Thursday, the contras
demanded that that private television channels be authorized, that the Supreme Court be elected
and that public opinion polls be legalized. At one point in the talks, Gen. Ortega reportedly said
the contras had no right to make such demands since they were "an illegitimate mercenary force."
The government has also insisted that contra leaders allow the Verification Commission to verify
the number of contras in each ceasefire zone. Contra leaders have insisted such information remain
secret. Reichler told journalists that sharp divisions among the contra leadership caused the talks
to reach an impasse on Thursday afternoon. He said Cesar told him the problems were with Col.
Enrique Bermudez. "He said Bermudez would follow orders from the [US] State Department and
he called him Col. America," said Reichler. Reichler also said he had met with Cesar on May 23 in
Miami, and that he and Cesar agreed on six demands by the contras for bringing democratic reforms
to Nicaragua. "We fully expected there would be an agreement two weeks ago based on what
Alfredo (Cesar) told us...Cesar is unwilling now to accept the terms he proposed unless Bermudez
goes along." On Thursday evening, tempers had apparently "cooled down," and prospects for future
talks appeared optimistic. According to the New York Times (06/10/88), before leaving Managua on
Thursday evening, the contra negotiators said they were willing to resume talks, but had not fixed
a date. In a communique read by Cesar the contra delegation said, "The Nicaraguan resistance will
not begin offensive military operations." Earlier, both sides denounced each other's proposals as
unacceptable. The contras demanded more sweeping political changes, and the government rejected
them as outrageous. Nonetheless, the government delegation then offered to discuss more limited
concessions, and the contras responded by calling the same inadequate. [Basic data from several
sources, including UPI, AP, Nicaragua Network (Washington DC), New York Times]
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